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Abstract
This thesis is about reform development and organizational change. It is a
case study of how an idea developed into a reform and gained the necessary support
to test it. The setting is a large federal bureaucracy: the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency. The innovation is negotiated rulemaking, a way to develop rules
which brings together affected parties and a mediator in an effort to reach consensus
on what a rule should say. The paper examines the important internal and external
agency factors that propelled the idea. It concludes that the reform reached the
demonstration stage due to a hybrid of personal and professional characteristics of a
few agency personnel, and the social, political and economic setting within which
the agency existed in.
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Preface
I wrote this case study with the advantage of an insider's view. I worked on
negotiated rulemaking in the Environmental Protection Agency during the summer
of 1982. Ken Young was my immediate supervisor. I saw firsthand how the idea
unfolded and gained momentum, and indeed, contributed in a small way to the
idea's development. I met and interacted with most of the important people
involved with the project. I watched how the Regulatory Reform Staff operated and
conducted business. I observed the organizational dynamics relating to the reform's
development.
My connection with negotiated rulemaking continued as a research assistant
for Professor Larry Susskind, Director of The Program on Negotiation at Harvard
Law School. The Program is working with the EPA to document the negotiation
demonstrations. I interviewed many of the key individuals connected with the
project to document their attitudes towards and expectations of the demonstrations.
We occasionally met with the EPA and Clark-McGlennon Associates, the consulting
firm chosen to convene and facilitate the first negotiation, to update one another
and discuss mechanics of the negotiations.
Throughout my involvement in negotiated rulemaking I sought to learn how
and why the reform developed. In writing this thesis I interviewed seven individuals
involved in negotiated rulemaking: Ken Young (ex-Project Director), Dan Fiorino
(Chief, Regulatory Management Staff), Nell Minow (ex-EPA General Counsel),
Philip Harter (private attorney), David Pritzer (the Administrative Conference of
the U.S.), Gail Coad (Office of Management and Budget), and John Palmisano
(Regulatory Reform Staff). They helped me develop the chronology of negotiated
rulemaking, and understand what propelled and impeded it and reforms in general.
Introduction
Formulating and testing new ways of doing things in government enables
agencies to learn. Innovation can solve problems, increase efficiency and
effectiveness, and enhance accountability. Reforms do not occur naturally though,
especially not in large federal government bureaucracies where inertia is the norm.
Something causes ideas to be researched, operationalized and tested. Precisely what
causes reforms is not evident and most likely differs in every case. Knowing how
one specific innovation developed into a reform and gained the support needed to
test it provides insights into the general reform development process and may aid
future reform efforts.
This thesis is a case study of the development of a particular innovation--
negotiated rulemaking--in a federal agency, the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA). Negotiated rulemaking is a radically different way to develop rules
than the current process. Negotiated rulemaking has never been used at the national
level to develop general rules or policies. In traditional rulemaking an agency
develops and publishes a "proposed" rule, solicits comments on it from affected
interests, considers the comments, and promulgates the final rule. By contrast,
negotiated rulemaking brings together affected parties--including industry, interest
groups and the rulemaking agency itself--before a rule is proposed. With the help of
a mediator they seek consensus on what a rule should say.
On February 22, 1983, a notice was published in the Federal Register
announcing a planned demonstration of negotiated rulemaking in the EPA and
soliciting candidate rules for the negotiations to center around. The case study that
follows traces the idea from its early beginnings in the EPA to the announcement of
the demonstration in the Federal Register. The case study attempts to answer the
following questions: How did the reform come to be? Why was it pursued? What
factors propelled its development? Were there barriers to overcome? What does
this case study tell us about innovation development and organizational change?
The case study is at once, many things: It is an ethnography of administrative
reform. It is a documentation of decision-making. It is a study of innovation
development. It is a description of bureaucratic dynamics. It hopefully will be an
aid to project directors who want to know how to get their ideas tested.
Part one of this thesis describes negotiated rulemaking and summarizes its
perceived advantages over the traditional rulemaking process. Part two gives a
synopsis of the idea's development. Part three sets the stage in which negotiated
rulemaking developed. Part four is the main body of the thesis and tells the story of
negotiated rulemaking in the EPA. Part five assesses negotiated rulemaking's broader
significance for understanding reform development and organizational change.
Part I
Traditional Rulemaking versus Negotiated Rulemaking
Rulemaking is a power delegated to federal administrative agencies. It is
defined as any agency process for formulating, amending or repealing a rule, where
a rule refers to a regulation, policy or procedure for implementing or interpreting
legislative mandates.
Federal rulemaking procedures are set forth by law in the Federal
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946. An agency first publishes a general notice of
proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in the Federal Register. The NPRM either explains
the terms or substance of the proposed rule or describes the subjects and issues
involved. The agency then offers "interested persons an opportunity to participate
in the rulemaking through sibmission of written data, views, or arguments with or
without opportunity for oral presentation.1  Next, the agency considers the
comments, makes any revisions it deems appropriate, and then promulgates the rule.
"Notice-and-comment rulemaking", as the traditional process is called,
frequently leads to litigation and subsequent appeals. Thus, the judicial branch
plays an important role in shaping policy. Reflecting this, "traditional regulatory
development" usually refers to the combined processes of notice-and-comment and
adjudication.
Negotiated . rulemaking is an alternative to the traditional regulatory
development process. It allows an unprecedented level of citizen participation in
agency decision-making. Affected and interested parties are convened to reach
15 U.S.C.A Section 553 (c), Federal Administrative Procedure Act. See Gellhorn and Byse,
Administrative Law, Foundation Press (1974).
consensus on what a rule should say. For example, parties might decide what level
of pollutant em misions are permitted, or how new toxic chemicals will be tested and
registered. Negotiated rulemaking is characterized by consensus building and face-
to-face negotiation among the interested parties, including the rulemaking agency.
The parties set ground rules to guide the negotiation, e.g., when to meet, who the
spokespersons will be, and what can be said to the press. They define the dispute
and its constituent issues. They jointly explore the issues and underlying interests.
They may collect additional data or information. The parties invent alternative
options and solutions. Throughout the process, the parties bargain, trade and
compromise. A mediator facilitates the discussions and caucuses with parties, but
can not force any party to accept an agreement. If a negotiated agreement is
reached, solving all or part of the problem, it is published in the Federal Register as
the agency's NPRM. Next, the rule goes through the normal comment and revision
process. Since all or most of the parties that comment on the NPRM are involved in
the aforementioned negotiation process, this stage is somewhat perfunctory, and
should go quickly and smoothly. The last stage is agency promulgation of the final
rule. Hopefully subsequent litigation is precluded.
Negotiated rulemaking offers three main advantages over traditional
rulemaking. First, the traditional rulemaking process usually resolves disputes
between parties in court after rules are promulgated. Negotiated rulemaking aims to
resolve conflicts out of court before rules are promulgated. Court proceedings--and
the anticipation of them--encourage parties to compete fiercely against one another
and take exaggerated positions to maximize their potential gains from judges. The
win-lose nature of judicial decision-making reinforces adversarial relations and
polarizes parties. Courts spend little time searching for solutions that lie between
the extremes. Judges traditionally evaluate claims before them, rather than
searching for innovative compromise solutions. As a result, court decisions are
frequently extreme and unsatisfactory to at least one of the parties. The dissatisfied
party(s) may slow down implementation of the rule or may appeal the decision to
another court. Court rulings that are middle-ground solutions typically please
neither party, largely because they do not represent a serious attempt to
accommodate the interests of all the litigants. Instead, middle-ground solutions are
arrived at by merely "splitting the difference" between the parties.
In contrast, negotiated rulemaking encourages parties to work with one
another to search for common ground and jointly solve their problems. Negotiated
rulemaking may facilitate compromise and mutual accommodation among parties
because the process is non-adversarial and seeks a solution that is acceptable to all
parties. The face-to-face collaborative problem-solving that characterizes
negotiation is more likely to develop positive working relationships among parties,
and humanize disputes. Comaraderie may develop and may subsequently fuel the
quest for a consensual agreement. The joint problem-solving process may enable
parties to correct misperceptions of one another and begin to see the larger picture
of conflicting priorities. A solution satisfying all parties may be found.
Second, substantive issues--at the heart of disputes--can be addressed easier in
negotiated rulemaking than in the traditional rulemaking process because the
former is a more flexible process. Because notice-and-comment rulemaking
frequently fails to develop a satisfactory rule, courts resolve disputes. Yet
adjudicatory processes and courtroom procedures are inflexible. Judicial review
scrutinizes procedure not substance. Courts have strict rules concerning what
evidence can be submitted. Useful infornation on substantive issues is often
barred. Evidence and information that is admissible in court is often screened,
simplified and distorted by parties because posturing is encouraged.
Negotiated rulemaking on the other hand, is more flexible. It can consider a
wider range of interests and admit more information directly bearing on the real
conflict. It can intercept numerous parties and issues. Direct dialogue discourages
the presentation of extreme positions and irrelevant information. Face-to-face
interaction and facilitating abilities of mediators tend to expose the true interests
and priorities behind parties' positions. Negotiation's flexibility allows parties to
concentrate on the important substantive issues. Time is not spent dwelling on
spurious and procedural issues, or perfecting and defending extreme stances, but on
designing a good solution that addresses the real problem.
A third advantage of negotiated rulemaking is that it permits quality citizen
participation. In notice-and-comment rulemaking, administrative agencies
determine unilaterally what the rule should be. Citizen involvement is more
"presentation" than "participation". Groups present their position on a rule in a
one-time submittal of comments. Parties are not able to respond to other comments,
nor make rebuttals to challenges of their position. If there are public hearings, they
usually fail to foster constructive participation because they encourage dramatic
presentations and defensive discussions. If a rule is litigated, a judge or tribunal
(versed in law, not science or policy) decides what the rule should be. The decision
is out of the hands of the parties.
In negotiated rulemaking the locus of decision-making authority shifts to the
parties themselves. The process seeks to provide direct and meaningful citizen
participation. Negotiated rulemaking resembles a legislative-political process;
affected parties collectively make complicated trade-offs, and balance conflicting
interests in an effort to design rules. Constructive citizen participation may make
rules better, more realistic; fairer and more acceptable. Implementation and
enforcement of a rule may be swifter and smoother if the affected parties help
design it than if it is decided by the agency or imposed by a court.
Part II
Synopsis of Idea's Development
The first talk of using negotiation in rulemaking 2 in the EPA dates back to
1978. The idea was amorphous at this stage. EPA was one of the most litigous
federal agencies. Top-level administrators believed that there had to be a better way
to settle disputes, one that was faster, cheaper and less adversarial. EPA had been
involved in a number of conflicts where environmental mediation had been
successfully employed. Because of the good track record of environmental
mediation, EPA began looking closer at negotiation and mediation to help resolve
several types of regulatory disputes, rulemaking being one of them. Negotiated
rulemaking did not become a project of any stature until early 1982, when Kenneth
C. Young, Jr. was named to lead the investigation of the idea. Six months later in a
turning point, Young formally received the go ahead to test negotiated rulemaking
in two demonstration projects. In the following four months, the project acquired
definite shape, and the logistics of running the demonstrations were planned.
Preparation for the first demonstration and final decision-making dragged on for
four more months. In late February 1983, the first demonstration got underway
with a formal notice in the Federal Register.
2TMe EPA called the idea "regulatory negotiation" or "reg. neg.", as did Congress, the Reagan
Administration, and the Administrative Conference of the U.S. Professionals in the dispute
resolution community prefer "negotiated rulemaking" because it distinguishes negotiation in
rulemaking from negotiation in other regulatory disputes, such as permitting, liscensing and
enforcement.
Part III
Context of Negotiated Rulemaking
Complaints and Growing Dissatisfaction
Throughout the 1970's many parts of society criticized the regulatory process.
By 1978 a remarkably diverse group of citizens and political leaders, business
executives and consumer advocates, economists and lawyers agreed on a
ftndamental point--something was wrong with much of the substance and
proceduTe of regulation. 3  Government regulation of business was commonly
described as "a disappointment at best, and more often than not, an utter failure and
scandal."4  The intellectual community wrote about the inability of the social,
political, and legal institutions to resolve environmental disputes in a timely,
efficient and decisive manner.5 In their view, the notice-and-comment rulemaking
process, originally intended to be a flexible, discretionary, legislative-type process,
had been relentlessly judicialized, formalized and rationalized into something quite
different.6
3See, e.g., R. Stewart, "Rethinking Regulation: Negotiation as an Alternative to Traditional
Rulemaking", Harvard Law Review, Volume 94, No. 8 (June 1981); Roger Cramton, "Causes and
Cures of Administrative Delay", American Bar Association Journal,Volume 937, No. 58 (1972); and
Morgan, "Towards a Revised Stategy for Rulemaking", University of Illinois Law Review, Volume 21,
No. 78 (1978).
4Paul H. Weaver, "Regulation, Social Policy and Class Conflict", The Public Interest, No. 50
(Winter 1978).
5Lawrence Susskind and Alan Wginstein, "Towards a Theory of Environmental Resolution",
Environnental Affairs, Volume 9:311, (1980).
6 See, e.g., Peter Schuck, "Litigation, Bargaining and Regulation", AEI Journal on Government and
Society (July/August 1979).
Business was outraged by the continual pattern of long project delays and
protracted litigations. Delays decreased revenues and significantly increased
material, construction, and legal costs. The uncertainty of unresolved conflicts
hindered intelligent investment decisions. Business objected not so much to the
goals of regulation, but the manner in which regulations were designed and
implemented.7  Critics argued that the very process by which regulations were
devised failed to take proper account of the practical needs and incentives of
business enterprise. They complained about the current implementation process,
arguing it often required exhaustive filing and reporting, and nitpicking compliance.
Business accused government of threatening them with "massive subpoenas, adverse
publicity, cumbersome compliance, and surprise new policies that demanded
sudden changes in business operating procedure and/or expensive retooling."8
Environmental groups' discontent took three forms. 9  They were resentful
because they considered themselves inadequately represented in decision-making.
They were frustrated because policy decisions seemed to be dissipated by political
biases and technical incompetence. And they were thwarted by the inability of
leadership to weld the numerous parts of government into a coherent unified and
effective team. In their opinion, environmental legislation was far from satisfactory.
There was not enough of it, it developed too slowly, and it was inadequately
implemented and enforced.
Prominent judges voiced concern over the growing imbalance of power
between administrative agencies and the judiciary, fearing "Government by the
7Robert B. Reich, "Regulation by Confrontation or Negotiation", Harvard Business Review
(May/June 1981).
8ibid.
9Herbert Kaufman, "Administrative Decentralization and Political Power", Public Administration
Review, Volume XXIX, No. 1 (Jan/Feb 1969).
Judiciary." 10 Moreover, judges questioned the ability of the courts to cope with the
complex scientific and technical issues characteristic of environmental disputes.11
Reform Thinking
In response to the widespread regulatory criticism, regulatory reform thinking
swept through the nation in the mid-1970's. A large empirical and theoretical
literature amassed describing alternative forms of regulation. 12 It was hoped that
changing regulatory mechanisms would decrease regulation's adverse impacts on
society. Most reforms addressed problems of implementation and enforcement.
Some examples include: emission fees, effluent charges, "bubbles" and emission
trading, consolidated permits, and environmental auditing.
Other reforms proposed to alter the rulemaking process. A popular theme to
remedy the ills of the regulatory malaise was more participative or "democratic"
administration. 13  For example, utilizing non-governmental standards (those
developed by the private sector "standard-writing industry") in developing
10 See, e.g., Levanthal, "Environmental Decision-making and the Role of the Courts", University of
Pennsylvania Law Review, Volume 509 (1974); and, D. Horowitz, "The Courts and Social Policy"
(1977).
11See, e.g., D.L. Bazelon, "Risk and Responsibility", Science, Volume 205, No. 20, (July 1979).
12See, e.g., R. Stewart and J. Krier, "Environmental Law and Policy", (1978); Lawrence White,
"Effluent Charges as a Faster Means of Achieving Pollution Abatement", Public Policy, Volume 25
(1976); Susan Rose-Ackerman, "Market Models for Water Polution Control", Public Policy, Volume
25, No. 3, (1977); Allen Kneese and Blair Bower, "Standards Charges and Equity", in Managing
Water Quality: Economics, Techn6logy, Institutions (1968), Resources for the Future.; S. Breyer,
"Analyzing Regulatory Failure", Harvard Law Review, Volume 92:549 (1979); Collin Diver, "A
Theory of Regulatory Enforcement", Public Policy, Volume 28, No. 3 (1980).
13Marvin Meade, "Participative Administration--Emerging Reality or Wishful Thinking?", in
Dwight Waldo's, "Public Administration in a Time of Turbulence" (1971).
mandatory federal standards affecting safety and health; 14  delegating standard-
development for product safety to selected groups outside the Consumer Product
Safety Commission (the "offeror" process); 15  and employing bargaining,
negotiation, and mediation techniques in many agency's policy development and
standard setting processes. 16
Growing Field of Environmental Dispute Resolution
Throughout the late 1970's the field of environmental dispute resolution, of
which negotiated rulemaking is a part of, burgeoned. The field was pioneered by
Gerald Cormick and Jane McCarthy, then of the Community Crisis Prevention
Center at Washington University in St. Louis. Numerous consensual techniques for
resolving environmental disputes out of court were developed, such as,
14Hamilton, "The Role of Non-Governmental Standards in the Development of Mandatory
Federal Standards affecting Safety or Health", Texas Law Review, Volume 1329, No. 56 (1978);
R. Dixon, "Standard Development in the Private Sector: Thoughts on Interest Representation and
Procedural Fairness".
15Teresa Schwartz, "Safety Commission: A Flawed Product of the Consumer Decade", A report to
the Administrative Conference of the U.S. (August 1982).
16See, e.g., Richard Stewart, "The Reformation of American Administrative Law", Harvard Law
Review, Volume 1667, No. 88 (1975); R. Stewart, "Regulation, Innovation and Administrative Law:
A Conceptual Framework", California Law Review, Volume 69, No. 5 (September 1981); R. Stewart,
"Rethinking Regulation: Negotiation as an Alternative to Traditional Rulemaking", Harvard Law
Review, Volume 94, No. 8 (June 1981); Philip Harter, "Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for the
Malaise?", Georgetown Law Review,(October 1982); L. Bacow, "Bargaining for Job Safety and
Health", MIT Press (1980); P. Schuck, "Litigation, Bargaining and Regulation", AEI Journal on
Government and Society (July/August 1979); S. Boyer, "Alternatives to Administrative Trail-type
Hearings for Resolving Complex Scientific, Economic and Social Issues", Michigan Law Review,
Volume III, No. 71 (1972).
facilitation,17  policy dialogue groups,18  consensus building,19  concilitation, 20
negotiation,21 and mediation.22 Over 35 organizations were formed specializing in
17Facilitation: a voluntary process to clarify and resolve differences among groups before a conflict
reaches impasse. Facilitation is most effective when used by groups with similar objectives and/or
having a functional interdependence where one can not act without the other. It involves infornal
collaborative problem solving exercises with a varying number of persons who may not officially
speak for specific groups. The problems and issues themselves are often ill-defined at the outset. The
group works toward consensus on the issues, but agreements may or may not be formally recognized
or documented at the end. Defined in "New Tools for Resolving Environmental Disputes", by Peter
Clark and Wendy Emrich. Prepared for Council of Environmental Quality and the Resource and
Land Investigations Program of the Geological Survey in the U.S. Department of the Interior (1980).
18Policy Dialogue Groups: a small group process in which traditional adversaries on public policy
issues meet to reason together, seeking areas of agreement and clarifications of their differences.
Defined by Samuel Gusman of The Conservation Foundation, in "Policy Dialogue", a paper
submitted for publication in Environmental Comment (10/30/81).
19Consensus Building: a method for making group decisions without voting. Agreement is reached
through a process of gathering information and viewpoints, discussing, persuading, synthesizing
proposals and developing new alternatives. Consensus is reached when everyone agrees to a solution.
Defined in "Natural Resource Conflict Management Workbook", prepared for a series of workshops
initiated by the U.S. Geological Survey (1980).
20Concilitation: a practice used to improve the attitudes different parties hold toward each other,
for the purpose of encouraging reasonable discussion and, where necessary, rational bargaining. It
employs a range of psychological techniques aimed at correcting perceptions, reducing hostility and
unreasonable fear, and clarifying differences. Defined in: ibid.
2 1Negotiation: a table process by which two or more conflicting parties attempt through bargaining
to reach an agreement on substantive issues about which they disagree. Negotiation generally
involves direct discussions between the conflicting groups and, if successful, results in a settlement in
which all parties' needs are met. Defined in: ibid.
22 Afediation: a voluntary process in which those involved in a dispute jointly explore and reconcile
their differences. The mediator has no authority to impose a settlement. His or her strength lies in
the ability to assist the parties in resolving their own differences. The mediated dispute is settled
when the parties themselves reach what they consider to be workable solution. Defined by Gerald
Cormick, Institute of Environmental Mediation.
environmental dispute resolution. 23
Environmental dispute resolution techniques were tested in numerous
23List developed from Lawrence Susskind's "Environmental Mediation and the Accountability
Problem". Vennont Law Review, Volume 6, No. 1 (Spring 1981), and "Agenda for Environmental
Negotiation", The Environmental Impact Assessment Review, Volume 3, No. 1, pg. 92-94 (1982):
Environmental Negotiation Program (MIT, Cambridge, MA); Harvard Negotiation Center (Harvard
Law School, Cambridge, MA); Institute for Environmental Mediation (Madison, WI); The
Conservation Foundation (Washington, D.C.); The Office of Environmental Mediation (Seattle,
WA); Clark-McGlennon Associates (Boston, MA); The Rocky Mountain Center on Environment
(ROMCOE), (Denver, CO); New England Environmental Mediation Center (Boston, MA); Center for
Environmental Conflict Resolution (Minneapolis, MI): Environmental Mediation International
(Washington, D.C.); The Environmental Mediation Service (Norfolk, VA); Keystone Center for
Continuing Education (Keystone, CO); FORUM on the Community and the Environment (Palo
Alto, CA); The Center for Environmental Conflict Resolution (Washington, D.C.); Federal
Mediation and Concilitaion Service; Western Network (Santa Fe, NM); Shorett and Associates
(Seattle, WA); Interaction Associates, Inc. (San Francisco, CA); Center for Conflict Resolution
(Honolulu, HI); Adaptive Environmental Assessment (Ft. Collins, CO); Illinois Environmental
Consensus Forum (Urbana, IL); Center for Collaborative Problem Solving (San Francisco, CA);
Scientists' Institute for Public Information (NY, NY); Public Mediation Service (Falls Church, VA);
Institute for Mediation and Conflict Resolution (NY, NY); Environmental Law Center (South
Royalton, VT); Center for Negotiation and Public Policy (Boston, MA); The Upper Midwest Council
(Minnesoto); New York University's Graduate School of Business Administration (NY, NY);
University of Colorado; Institute for Environmental Negotiation (Charlottesville, VA); American
Arbitration Association (NY, NY).
environmental conflicts and many were written up as case studies.24,25 Evaluators
and participants, often including EPA regional offices, commended negotiation and
mediation techniques in many of the disputes. Other parts of the federal
government, e.g., Department of Energy, Department of Agriculture, and the
Department of the Interior, used negotiation and mediation and were encouraged
24L. Susskind identifies many case studies in "Environmental Mediation and the Accountability
Problem", Vennont Law Review, Volume 6, No. 1, pg. 3-4 (Spring 1981).
Snoqualmie River Dispute, see G. Cormick, "Mediating Environmental Controversies: Perspectives
and First Experiences", 2 Earth Law Journal (1976).
White Fli.nt Shopping Mall, see Malcolm Rivkin, "An Issue Report: Negotiated Development, a
Breakthrough in Environmental Controversies" (1977).
The National Coal Policy Project, see Detailed Reports of the Task Forces: Two Volumes and a
Summary, F. Murray ed. (April 1978). Published by the National Coal Policy Project, CSIS,
Georgetown University.
Bachman Warbler Dispute, see "Resolving the Bachman's Warbler Controversy", Conservation
News, Volume 1, No. 13, at 10-12 (August 1977).
General Electric PCB Case, see A. Weinstein, "Application of Environmental Mediation to Energy
Facility Siting Dispute: Prospects and Problems", unpublished Master's Thesis submitted to the
Department of Urban Studies and Planning, MIT (May 1979).
Grayrocks Dam, see Julie Wondolleck, "Bargaining for the Environment: Compensation and
Negotiation in the Energy Facility Siting Process", unpublished Master's thesis submitted to the
Department of Urban Studies and Planning, MIT (September 1979).
25.
'Colstrip Power Plant", Timothy Sullivan; "Negotiated Rulemaking (301(h) Case)", Diane
Hoffman and Mary Lucci; "Foothills Water Project", Heidi Burgess; "Brayton Point Coal
Conversion", Doug Smith; "Brown Paper Company", David Gilmore; "Jackson Water Treatment
Plant", Steven Hill;"Holston River", Alexander Taegerman. All in "Resolving Environmental
Regulatory Disputes" by Lawrence Susskind, Lawrence Bacow, and Michael Wheeler, Schenckman
Publishing Company (1983).
Interstate 90, Portage Islands and Port Townsend Ferry Terminal; See Allan Talbot, "Environmental
Mediation, Three Case Studies", published by the Institute for Environmental Mediation.
Homestead Mining; See Larry Lempart, "Lawyers sans Armor Resolve Environmental Case", Legal
Times, Volume IV, No. 50 (May 24, 1982).
Policy Dialogue Groups, for a) training of taxicologist, b) initial testing of new industrial chemicals,
c) follow-up for new chemicals after they are manufactured, d) identification of low risk situations for
new chemicals, e) road construction in national forests, f) definition of hazardous wastes, g) infor-
mation for communities hazardous waste disposal sites. See S. Gusman, The Conservation
Foundation, "Policy Dialogue", a paper submitted for publication in Environmental Comment
(10/30/81).
with the results. 26  Negotiation and mediation was successfully employed to
develop policy in a few fedeial agencies: development of regulation for cable
television and exchange network facilities for interstate access (the Federal
Commerce Commission); setting of producer prices of natural gas (the Federal
Power Commission); setting of standards for telecommunication's electrical systems
in hazardous locations, and protective equipment for supermarket employees in
meat departments (the Office of Safety and Health Administration); and
development of automileage regulation (Department of Transportation). 27
A large amount of literature on environmental dispute resolution techniques
26Nancy Stockholm, in "New Approaches to Managing Environmental Conflict: How can the
Federal Government Use Them?", Report for the Council on Environmental Quality (June 1980),
compiles a compediun of federal experiences with environmental mediation as of 1980.
27P. Harter, "Report to the Administrative Conference of the U.S. on Regulatory Negotiations"
(Fall 1981).
and their applications had amassed.28 Some of it found its way onto desk's of
business executives, environmentalists, politicians, attorneys, community leaders,
and bureaucrats. Several national and regional workshops and conferences on
environmental dispute resolution were held. The Administrative Conference of the
United States' (ACUS) adoption of a resolution on regulatory negotiations was
evidence of the widespread support of the idea in government.29 By the time
negotiated rulemaking found its way into the EPA bureaucracy, it was supported by
a substantial body of literature.
2 8See, e.g., David O'Connor, "Environmental Mediation: the State-of-the Art", Environmental
Impact Assesment Review, published by the Lab of Architecture and Planning, MIT (October 1978).
American Management Systems Consultants, "The Potential of Mediation for Resolving
Environmental Disputes Related to Energy Facilities" (1979). American Management Systems
Consultants, "The Potential of Alternative Conflict-Management Techniques for Resolving
Environmental Disputes related to Energy Facilities", Report for the Department of Energy (1980).
L. Susskind and A. Weinstein, "Towards a Theory of Environmental Dispute Resolution",
Environmental Affairs, Volume 9 (1980-81). Nancy Stockholm, "New Approaches to Managing
Environmental Conflict: low Can the Federal Government Use Them?", prepared for the Council
on Environmental Quality (CEQ) (June 1980). Clark-McGlennon Associates, "New Tools for
Resolving Environmental Disputes", published in cooperation with American Arbitration
Association (AAA), CEQ, and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) (1980). Susan Carnduff and Joel
Russell, "Alternative Environmental Mediation Structures within the Federal Government", Final
Report to the CEQ (1980). Clark-McGlennon Associates, "Selected Readings on Conflict
Management", published in cooperation with AAA, CEQ, USGS (1980). Clark-McGlennon
Associates, "Environmental Conflict Management-Working Papers", published in cooperation with
AAA, CEQUSGS (1981). Howard Bellman, Gail Bingham, Ronnie Brooks, Susan Carpenter, Peter
Clark and Robert Craig, "Environmental Conflict Resolution: Practitioner's Perspective of an
Emerging Field", Resolve Newsletter (Winter 1981). Gail Bingham, "Does Negotiation hold a
promise for Regulatory Reform?", Resolve (Fall 1981). L. Susskind and A. Weinstein, "How to
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Part IV
How Negotiated Rulemaking Developed
Early Beginnings
The identified regulatory malaise, reform spirit and growing environmental
dispute resolution field was the backdrop for negotiated rulemaking's story in the
EPA. The idea of using negotiated rulemaking in the EPA first emerged during the
Carter Administration. Douglas M. Costle was the EPA Administrator. Regulatory
reform was one of his top priorities,30 influenced in part by the environment
surrounding him. Costle was committed to be a regulatory reform leader. He
propagated a reform spirit in the Agency and attracted many high-caliber
entrepreneurs.
Two areas in which Costle encouraged reform thinking were regulatory
development and public participation. By 1978 two procedural reforms in
regulatory development had been tested and deemed successes.31 One involved
cancellation of pesticide registration, the other, issuing of water pollution discharge
permits. Both actions traditionally were formal, court-like hearings, which proved
ill-suited for agency decision-making. The new procedure for pesticide decision-
making used technical panels for gathering information and making decisions. The
new procedure for water discharge permit used informal, legislative-style hearings.
Both reforms were managed by the Office of General Counsel (OGC).
These two reforms served as stepping stones for the emergence of negotiated
30
"Regulatory Reform Initiatives, Quarterly Progress Report", published by the EPA (August
1978), p.i.
31ibid.
rulemaking in the EPA. They demonstrated to the Agency that informal, joint
problem-solving processes could work in regulatory decision-making, and had
numerous advantages over the normal processes. The reforms also illustrated that a
high-level of citizen participation in decision-making was manageable and, more
importantly, the affected parties' expertise in scientific and technical issues was
extremely useful.
The reform crusade continued. With so many keen policy analysts looking for
reforms, it is not too surprising that some landed on negotiation and mediation
techniques. Environmental dispute resolution had developed into a field of some
stature and, as has been previously mentioned, negotiation and mediation had been
successfully employed in numerous environmental conflicts. Further, negotiated
rulemaking was being touted as the cure for the regulatory malaise. Researching the
idea would be a statement of EPA's concern in the litigousness and regulatory
miasma, and their desire to improve it. Not pursuing the idea might have portrayed
EPA as insensitive, unresponsive, or ignorant of the growing environmental dispute
resolution field.
In 1978 EPA's General Counsel, headed by Jody Bernstein, began to examine
how negotiation might be used to resolve regulatory disputes in permitting,
enforcement, registration, and especially rulemaking. Nell Minow, then special
assistant to Bernstein, conducted the examination. The exploration of the idea
began, Minow recalls, when Bernstein "handed [her] a brochure about
environmental mediation by Gerald Cormick's Institute for Environmental
Mediation based in Seattle, and said look into this." Minow read the brochure,
contacted Cormick, and had numerous discussions with him. OGC then contracted
with Cormick's organization to further develop environmental mediation concepts.
EPA contributed $10,000 to the effort and several other agencies matched EPA's
contribution.
In mid-1980, a representative from EPA appeared before a Senate Hearing on
regulatory negotiation and strongly support the idea.32  Testimony was also heard
from representatives of both the private sector and public sector who had specific
experiences in regulatory negotiation, including the National Coal Policy Group
and The Conservation Foundation. The witnesses supported regulatory negotiation
as a valuable aid to achieving more flexible and workable regulatory policies. An
outgrowth of these Senate hearings, was a proposed Senate bill that encouraged the
utilization of regulatory negotiation, and authorized grants for administrative
expenses of regulatory negotiation commissions. 33 However, the bill went nowhere.
Change of Administration
The change of administrations in 1980 slowed the development of negotiated
rulemaking. All but EPA's most basic functions halted. It took over a year to put
together a team of political appointees and bring them tip to speed. Negotiated
rulemaking, still at the conceptual stage, was low on the list of priorities. It was not
an urgently needed reform, but a "chique procedural reform dreamed tip by
moderate intellectuals concerned with good government", expressed an outside
observer. The ideological bent of the new Administration also retarded the idea.
Reagan's anti-environmental stance caused a massive exodus out of EPA. The
Agency was grossly understaffed and those remaining had to concentrate on the
basic functionings of the Agency. Further, as one agency employee recalled,
"Reagan's people came in with a seige mentality. They mistrusted most of the
Agency. . . they didn't want to hear anything from anyone". Most of the ideas
pursued by the previous Administration, including negotiated rulemaking, were
automatically suspect, and resisted. The new Administration's intention was "to sell
32
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out to industry", continued the EPA employee. Thus without understanding the idea
nor knowing much about environmental regulatory disputes, Reagan's appointees
saw negotiated rulemaking as impeding their efforts to "sell out", since both
environmental groups and industry would be allowed to participate. "The new
Administration preferred to negotiate with industry alone, and was confident it
could do so."
Cannon
Negotiated rulemaking was not pursued in the new Administration until
Joseph A. Cannon, head of the policy office,34 entered the Agency. By fall of 1981
his office began investigating the idea. Cannon's interest in negotiated rulemaking
arose from many reasons. First, Cannon was in a precarious situation: he entered
the Agency as an acting head of the policy office. Cannon needed to create an
impressive portfolio to have any chance of becoming the permanent head. Cannon
was convinced negotiated rulemaking would succeed because of the good track
record environmental dispute resolution techniques had. Further, environmental
mediation was a popular idea and was gaining widespread support from industry,
environmental groups, and all levels of government. Investigating such a popular
idea might be the advertisement he needed. Second, Cannon saw political gains in
backing negotiated rulemaking. As the previous Administration had realized,
pursuing negotiated rulemaking portrayed the agency as responsive, innovative, and
committed to improving performance and efficiency. Additionally, the Reagan
Administration, Office of Management and Budget (0MB), and the President's Task
Force on Regulatory Relief liked the idea and were supportive of it. With all the
interest and support of negotiated rulemaking Cannon must have seen an
opportunity for significant personal gain. If he was responsible for the first
demonstration of negotiated rulemaking and it succeeded and grew into a sweeping
341is official title was Acting Associate Administrator, Office of Planning and Resource
Management (OPRM).
reform throughout the federal government, Cannon would become well-known in
many circles. A fourth motivating factor in Cannon's pursuit of negotiated
rulemaking was his genuine interest in procedural reforms and his knowledge of
administrative law. He had practiced law for several years and was very familiar
with the aggravation and costs associated with litigation. He believed many disputes
were better settled out of court. Negotiated rulemaking became his "pet project".
Young
A fifth factor motivating Cannon to pursue regulatory negotiation was Ken
Young, an interested, knowledgeable and capable EPA employee. Young worked in
the Regulatory Reform Staff (RRS) and established an early relationship with
Cannon by writing his speeches. In early 1982, Young became seriously interested
in negotiated rulemaking within the Agency.
Many of Young's motivations to pursue regulatory negotiation were similiar to
Cannon's. First, Young was interested in the idea and familiar with adjudicatory
processes. Like Cannon, Young had practiced law for several years and saw
firsthand the many weaknesses and constraints of courtroom procedures. Young
too, was convinced there was a better way to settle differences. His feelings and
ideas were nurtured while at the Mid-Career Public Administration Program at
Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. Second, Young saw that he could
personally benefit by investigating regulatory negotiation. Like Cannon, he was
looking for a good project to link up with to expand his portfolio. Young strongly
believed negotiated rulemaking was a good idea and likely to succeed. Being project
director of a successful, popular administrative reform could make headlines and
law review articles, would lead to career advancement, and would certainly invite
contacts with a host of professionals.
Two individuals were spending some of their time examining the idea's
potential, one in Cannon's office, another in the Regulatory Management Staff.
However, both individuals had other commitments and were very receptive to
Young's interest in working on negotiated rulemaking. Young soon became project
director and the loosely defined "project" was transferred to his office. Young had
several other responsibilities at that time so at first, could not devote much time to
negotiated rulemaking. Yet he kept the idea simmering.
After Young concentrated on negotiated rulemaking, the idea took shape and
moved. The steps he took in managing the project proved to be a recipe for success.
His astute intuition of organizations allowed him to anticipate conflicts and design
strategies to avoid them.
By mid-1982 Young was devoting half his time to negotiated rulemaking.
Young stressed the need for "small and early successes" to build a good track record
for negotiated rulemaking. His strategy for policy change was to conduct a series of
negotiation "experiments". The experiments would be small-scale demonstrations,
which limited the risks of real or percieved failure; the small-scale of the
demonstrations meant less resources were at risk and the demonstrations could be
portrayed simply as "experiments" if they failed terribly. The project did not scrap
the traditional rulemaking structure, only supplemented it, so the status quo was
always there to fall back on. The "experiment" strategy would enable both EPA and
its constituencies to gradually become familiar and skilled with the new process. In
addition, the experimental negotiations would center around rules that were highly
likely to be successfully negotiated. Young developed criteria for carefully selecting
such "negotiable" rules, and later circulated them to groups who would nominate
candidate rules for the demonstrations.
Young developed a cogent memorandum delineating the benefits of
negotiated rulemaking. The memorandum was written to advertise, but also to help
tighten Young's thinking.
Young took steps to de-radicalize the idea, thereby increasing its likelihood of
acceptance. Young wrote up past successful experiences the EPA and other federal
agencies had had with processes similiar to negotiated rulemaking. By emphasizing
the similarities of these experiences with the negotiated rulemaking, Young further
decreased the perceived risks of the demonstrations. Young knew negotiated
rulemaking was much more likely to survive if it was backed by the people involved
in the normal regulatory development process. He anticipated the difficulty of
getting their support because negotiated rulemaking could be construed as
"threatening their turf'. To assuage their fears and portray negotiated rulemaking
as supportive of established procedures, Young met with the top official concerned
with regulation development (the Chief of the Regulatory Management Staff).
After these conversations Young developed a framework for integrating negotiated
rulemaking into the normal regulation development and review processes. Young
described negotiated rulemaking in a non-threatening fashion. For example, "[It]
slightly alters the tasks and relationships of the groups in the current process, but in
ways that are easy to understand and familiar." (emphasis added).
Integrating negotiated rulemaking into the established regulatory
development process was also important to get the support of potentially involved
parties outside EPA. To pursuade the parties to commit sufficient resources and to
take the negotiations seriously, Young had to convince them the negotiations would
be the real rulemaking of a real rule. The demonstrations would not be
experimental theatrical productions. Perceived integration was so crucial that in
August, Young and the project were transferred to the Regulatory Management
Staff, the office responsible for regulatory development. The Regulatory
Management Staff was a more functional and legitimate place for negotiated
rulemaking.
Legal Issues
A potential problem confronting Young was the legal issues raised by the
experiments. For example, did the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) posed
any constraints on the negotiation? Would the negotiation process amount to an
illegal delegation of statutory power? EPA's legal office believed FACA would almost
certainly apply to the negotiations. FACA imposed a number of onerous procedural
constraints limiting the negotiation's flexibility. For example, meetings must be
open to the public and detailed minutes must be kept. To meet FACA requirements
EPA first had to obtain a "FACA charter" from the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB), which registers the negotiation as an Advisory Group. This proved
to be a long and time-consuming process.
Gusman's Interest
Samuel Gusman, of The Conservation Foundation, was also an important
force behind negotiated rulemaking's development. Gusman was well-known in the
dispute resolution field and had extensive experience with negotiation and
mediation techniques in environmental conflicts. He had extensive experience with
"policy dialogue groups", a process similiar to negotiated rulemaking which
convenes interested parties to seek areas of agreement and clarifications of their
differences.
Early in 1982 Gusman heard of EPA's negotiated rulemaking project, quickly
contacted Young and established a good rapport with him. As Young recalls,
"[Gusman] was a powerful influence in the project's formulation." Gusman sent
many articles and literature to Young about environmental conflict resolution
generally and negotiated rulemaking specifically. Gusman continually called Young
to keep updated on the project and to discuss any idea and questions Young had.
Gusman was a sounding board for many of Young's ideas. Gusman even spoke
with Cannon, the head of the policy office, about negotiated rulemaking and its
potential advantages.
Gusman was the major force behind changing the mechanics of the
demonstrations. Initially the RRS, in the policy office of the EPA, was planning to
function as the mediator ("convenor/facilitator") in the negotiations. The RRS
would attempt to function as an honest broker concerned primarily with the success
of the negotiation rather than the final shape of the rule. The EPA program office
whose area the rule fell under would act as party-in-interest for the Agency. The
intent was to establish in the policy office the capacity to act as a process controller
and facilitator for future negotiations based on its lack of specific program
responsibility, its unique role as the manager of regulation development, and its
established success in regulatory reform. Gusman sharply criticized EPA's dual role
in the demonstrations and publicly denounced it. Gusman argued that "inside"
mediators would never be able to gain parties' trust because of their ostensible lack
of neutrality. Gusman's words had weight, and EPA decided the first demonstration
would be conducted by an "outside" mediator, a professional outside of the EPA.
Nature of the Regulatory Reform Staff
The office which housed the negotiated rulemaking project, the Regulatory
Reform Staff (RRS), was critical in the idea's development. The RRS's role was, as
the name suggested, to undertake regulatory reforms. It was the only office in EPA
exclusively devoted to reform. The RRS was the institutional structure for reform
development. The RRS thought up major policy reforms and tried to push them
through the Agency. The staff researched ideas, formulated them into concrete
projects, and tested them. An intricate part of the staffs work was selling their ideas
both inside and outside the EPA. Thus when negotiated rulemaking landed in the
RRS, it fell into experienced hands. Once a staff member got behind an idea it had a
good chance of getting attention, receiving funding, and being tested. Negotiated
rulemaking was incorporated into the RRS's "advertising brochure", was included in
regular briefing meetings with agency and non-agency personnel, and became a dot
point in the agency speeches on regulatory reform initiatives.
Organizational Structure
The RRS's organizational location was also important in the successful
development of negotiated rulemaking. The difference between the formal and
informal lines of command was a critical factor. (Diagrammed below.) Formally,
Young, project director of negotiated rulemaking, was to report to his boss, who was
to report to the Deputy Director and then Director of the division, who was to
report to the Deputy Associate Administrator of the overall policy office, who was to
report finally to the Associate Administrator of the policy office, Cannon. The
informal communication lines were much different. In reality either Young or his
boss, Levin, reported directly to Cannon. The power of personal contact with
Cannon should not be underestimated. The reform received top-managerial
attention. This leapfrogging of the chain of command ocurred for a number of
reasons. Most of the RRS' projects required on-going, top-level policy decisions.
Reform was a top priority for Cannon and the Administration. Some of the staff's
projects were politically sensitive. Some projects were of great interest to Cannon.
Levin, the chief of the RRS, had "exceptional bureaucratic capability". He knew
reforms needed top-management support to have any chance of success. He was a
persuasive person and found convincing reasons to get what he wanted. Further,
Levin and his staff were attractive to Cannon because they were "a bunch of high-
caliber entrepreneurs with good reputations".
Formal versus Informal Communication Lines
Office of.Policy and Resource Management
Associate Administrator (Joseph Cannon)
Deputy Associate Administrator
Divisions
Office of Standards and Regulations
Director (C. Ronald Smith)
Deputy Director (Alan Jennings)
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Program versus Policy Office
The relationship between the program offices and the policy office, was a
second aspect of agency structure that helped the idea develop into a demonstration.
The four program offices were concerned with substantive issues in their respective
areas: air, water, solid waste, and toxic substances. They were staffed mainly by
scientists and career employees. The policy office was concerned with policy and
regulation development, management, and evaluation. It was staffed by a large
percentage of young policy analysts and social scientists, and had a large turnover
rate. Reforms usually came from the policy office, and directly affected the
program offices; reforms change the distribution of gains and losses, and often
threaten the turf of the program office staff. The program offices and the policy
office were somewhat antagonistic. The program offices sometimes resented policy
analysts "meddling in their affairs". At the same time, the policy analysts saw the
program office staff as "the part of the bureaucracy that stagnates."
Reforms can be hindered or halted by program office resistance. Negotiated
rulemaking was unique in that program office's were barely consulted in
development and decision-making, and they were not in any position to block the
demonstration. The idea was purely the policy office's-idea. It needed no program
office support to be tested. Whether the absence of program office consultation
hurts the quality of the negotiations and implementation of negotiated rulemaking is
another question, and remains to be seen.
Personnel Changes
Numerous personnel changes disrupted the idea's continuity and chopped its
momentum. Each time employees changed there was delay while the replacement
learned his or her new duties. Routine activites had to be mastered before any time
could be spent on interesting reforms or pet projects. Turnover made implementing
a consistent plan of action difficult. Each new individual connected with negotiated
rulemaking had less stake in the project, and less to gain in pursuing it.
The top position in the policy office turned over twice. Cannon was the acting
head for a year, at which time he singled out negotiated rulemaking and became an
important supporter. When he was promoted to permanent head of the office,
regulatory negotiation dropped on his list of priorities. Responsibilities that had
been temporarily spread around to other offices to help Cannon out as acting head,
were now transferred back to Cannon and filled his time.
The director of the RRS's division had been an acting since the new
Administration had entered and throughout negotiated rulemaking's critical
formulative stages. The acting director had little clout with the RRS. The RRS
leapfrogged the formal chain of command and reported directly to Cannon.
Although, as mentioned in the previous section, the direct link to Cannon helped
the idea's development, it simultaneously hurt the idea in another sense. It
narrowed the number of top officials who were concerned with the idea to one--
Cannon, who was the busiest. Even when Cannon was acting he was a busy man.
He did not have much time to discuss the many issues that arose from the project,
and certainly not the mundane ones. Turn around time for Cannon's decisions was
long. Contacting him and setting up appointments took at least a week. The reform
needed constant top-management's direction and authority to move forward
quickly, but it failed to receive it. Workplans continually become outdated. Face-
to-face negotiations that had been planned for July, 1982 were rescheduled for
October, then for Spring of 1983, and most recently planned for mid-summer, 1983.
When the permanent director of the division was appointed, the RRS was
forced to use the formal channels of communication. The direct link to Cannon was
shut off, yet at first the director's door was barely open. Like other new appointees,
the director needed time to learn his new responsibility and concentrated mostly on
his basic duties. Negotiated rulemaking received little of his attention, especially
since the RRS did not share its projects with the director, wanting to retain its direct
link to Cannon. 'Fortunately, the project had enough momentum at this stage to
keep it rolling.
The lead investigator of negotiated rulemaking changed several times through
the idea's crystalization. First, the idea was researched by a lawyer in the General
Counsel's office. Then someone in Cannon's office pursued the idea. Next it was
investigated by the Regulatory Management Staff (in the same division as RRS).
The fourth lead investigator was Ken Young in the RRS. Young was by far the most
important manager of the idea. Then Young and the project was transferred to the
Regulatory Management Staff. After the project had a life of its own, Young took
another job outside the agency and Chris Kirtz became the project director.
Superfund Controversy
Another factor slowing the project was the turmoil in the EPA that erupted in
February and March, 1983 over alleged political finagling of Superfund money.
The controversy eventually lead to the resignation of many top officials in the
agency, including Ann M. Gorsuch, The Administrator. Six congressional panels,
the FBI, the Justice Department and the White House investigated the agency. The
turmoil had a freezing effect on project decision-making throughout the agency.
Top-management's time was devoted to carefully assessing the controversies and
defending the agency in the dispute. Turn around time for decisions lengthened
significantly. The Superfund controversy also impeded the project in an indirect
way. EPA's trustworthiness suffered a blow. Potential participants of the
demonstration, especially environmental groups, became more leary of EPA's
sincerity in the demonstration. Additionally, negotiated rulemaking got a bad name
because it sounded (to untrained ears) like the reported "luncheon negotiations"
EPA had had with industry groups.
Epilogue
Negotiated rulemaking succeeded in reaching the testing stage due to a hybrid
of internal and external agency factors. Several barriers delayed the project but did
not stop it.
Supporters of negotiated rulemaking hope the carefully controlled
demonstrations will create convincing success stories and that, overtime, negotiated
rulemaking will supplement the regulatory development process. Whether the
negotiations will succeed, and whether the demonstration strategy for policy change
will succeed in implementing negotiated rulemaking, remains to be seen.
Negotiated rulemaking has gained "good currency" 35 in parts of EPA and in
many organizations, yet it may only take one recalcitrant participant to make the
demonstrations fail, and to hurt the idea's credibility. Individuals connected with
the project are concerned that parties may not participate in good faith, if at all,
especially EPA program offices and environmental groups. Program offices are
threatened by negotiated rulemaking. They had to be told by top-level management
to cooperate throughout the process, and to search for possible rules to use in the
demonstration. Only the Air Office submitted candidate rules. No environmental
group nominated rules for the demonstration in response to the Federal Register
notice and personal phone calling. This may be due, in part, to the Superfund
controversy. Many environmental groups have voiced their reservations about the
viability of negotiation in rulemaking, its touted benefits, and about EPA's sincerity
in the negotiations. Advocates of negotiated rulemaking hope program offices and
environmental groups will overcome their fears and conclude the benefits of
negotiated rulemaking outweigh the costs of changing to a new process.
35Donald A. Schon, Beyond the Stable State (1971). "Good currency" of an idea means it has
gained acceptance, support, or a good name.
Part V
Lessons for Other Reform Efforts
This case study illustrates that bureaucracies do not operate in vacuums but
constantly interact with their environments. Incentives to support reforms and
accept organizational changes are produced through a mixing of complex internal
processes with the social, political, economic, and intellectual setting the agency
exists in. Project directors can create numerous incentives to change. However,
many factors which influence incentives are outside their control. The major
"uncontrollables" in most reform efforts are the prevailing political, economic, and
intellectual climates. How these climates influenced negotiated rulemaking is
described below.
Political currents
The political climate during negotiated rulemaking's critical stages of
development was conducive to its development and testing. The Reagan
Administration's idealogies determined EPA's attitude towards the idea because the
EPA Administrator, appointed by the President, lacked independence and a will of
her own. The Reagan Administration strongly advocated using negotiation to settle
differences. It supported negotiation not only in the EPA but in other agencies as
well. Vice President George Bush, the Presidential Task Force on Regulatory
Relief, and the Office of Management and Budget all publicly suppported
negotiated rulemaking, and privately encouraged its use in the EPA. Adopting
negotiated rulemaking was seen as a way to improve EPA's deteriorating public
image, which was becoming a bigger political liability by the week. Pursuing the
idea would portray EPA as responsive, innovative, open to other interests besides
business', and committed to improving performance and efficiency. It was also
another reform to add to the Administration's list of accomplishments. Negotiated
rulemaking was believed to save business significant resources by decreasing
adjudicatory delay and costs, and therefore would help EPA maintain business'
support.
Economic situation
Economic problems in the early 1980's created public sentiment that was
conducive to negotiated rulemaking's development. The economy was in a
recession. Much of the public muted their anti-business regulation rhetoric for fear
that additional regulation might cost jobs. Businesses had to be regulated but not at
the expense of long, costly and adversarial adjudicatory processes. Resources were
scarce and had to be saved for only urgent reasons. Business were very concerned
with the downturn of the economy. They wanted to save wherever possible, and
certainly wanted to avoid expensive litigations. Many in the private and public
sector thought negotiation seemed like a good solution given budgetary restrictions.
Intellectual climate
A substantial literature existed demystifying negotiations and deducing its
potential benefits. The literature had begun piecing together a theory of
environmental dispute resolution. For example, there were articles explaining what
disputes are likely to be negotiable, offering methods to select and bind legitimate
stakeholders, describing fundamental steps in negotiations, and delineating criteria
to measure the success of negotiations. Theory made negotiated rulemaking
understandable and more persuasive. The literature convinced Cannon, Young, the
Administration and EPA'S constituents that negotiated rulemaking was a good idea
to try. Giving the idea even more legitimacy, several influential intellectuals of
regulation and public administration supported the premises on which negotiated
rulemaking is based: increased public participation, less agency discretion and
government-business partnerships.
Most of the concepts and processes involved in negotiated rulemaking had
been tested in site-specific environmental conflicts. The number and variety of the
conflicts enabled hypotheses to be tested. Practice was constantly improved.
Techniques that worked well repeatedly were identified. The numerous local and
regional conflicts using negotiation and mediation helped familiarize and build
interest in the process.
More important than what a project director cannot control, is the
environment he or she can control. Identifying and discussing "controllables" is
more useful for project directors who want to learn how to push reforms through
organizations. The case study suggests several actions one can take to improve the
chances of successful reform: institutionalize an office promoting reform, gain top-
level interest and support, and reduce the threat of change.
Institutionalize an office promoting reform.
The RRS was a critical factor propelling negotiated rulemaking. Young and
his boss, Levin, were rewarded for changing the status quo rather than preserving it.
They were accountable for the reforms they backed. Since it was their primary job
to push reforms through the bureaucracy they were good at it. The office's job was
to keep abreast of reform literature and search for innovations. The staff was
trained in public policy and organizational analysis, and used these skills to push
ideas and marshal support for them inside and outside the agency. They were
experienced in operationalizing ideas into concrete projects, and then managing
them. And lastly, people listened when the staff talked because they had built a
reputation of backing good reforms and managing them well.
An institutionalized office of reform may be a general solution to bureaucratic
inertia. To achieve this end, Levin believes the office must have a clear charter to act
as centralized manager for reform, complete with sign-off authority on all offices'
reform proposals. Centralizing reform enables innovations to be winnowed,
prioritized, tracked and evaluated. Centralization of reform efforts is particularly
important for coordinating and implementing system-wide and multi-office reforms.
Levin further stresses that the office should be both accountable and responsible for
delivering reforms, giving it authority, credibility and leverage. Formal authority is
needed to insure offices cooperate in identifying, developing and implementing
reforms. Without formal authority, the office has no stick.
However, centralizing reform is not without risks. First, it may be difficult to
empower the office, the end result being fewer reforms than without the office. If
the office is located anywhere else but the center of decision-making in the top
echelons of the agency, program staff and outside contacts will not pay much
attention to it. Who the agency reports to determines how people respond. If the
office is on the periphery of decision-making it may lack sufficient authority and
power to leverage what it needs. Program offices would feel the reform office was
trespassing on their turfs, and grow very antagonistic towards the office. Not being
at the center of decision-making also prevents the office from responding quickly to
people inside and outside the Agency, critical for maintaining credibility and reform
momentum, because decisions would have to go through extra levels of
bureaucracy.
Second, centralizing reform may dampen innovation in other parts of the
agency. Program and other office staff might feel the reform office would receive
credit for any innovation they propose, creating a disincentive to innovate. Fewer
heads thinking about reform, means fewer reforms. And importantly, if program
offices stop thinking about reform, implementing reform will be more difficult
because they will value current ways of doing things more.
Third, some reforms may require more techinical and scientific knowledge
then the reform office has. For fear of losing some power, and bringing in a
stranger, the office may not seek the necessary expertise and continue its efforts
regardless, or may. not pursue such technical reforms. Related to the reform office's-
potential lack of sufficient technical and scientific knowledge, its relations with
program offices and other policy offices (e.g., economic analysis office) may be
further strained. The offices are likely to argue their skills are important, yet
difficult to learn, and conclude the reform office is meddling in their affairs.
Get support from top management.
The support of Cannon, the head of the policy office was critical throughout
negotiated rulemaking's development. Cannon was the key decision-maker, and
could start or stop the project on command. The legitimacy of the reform also
depended on Cannon's support. People would not commit resources, nor pay much
attention to Young and Levin if the project was not approved by top-management.
Acquiring Cannon's initial support was relatively easy since he proposed researching
the idea. The chances the project would be shelved were decreased by including
negotiated rulemaking in many of his public speeches. The RRS ran a number of
workshops on regulatory reform around the country and frequently got Cannon to
speak at them. More importantly, Young was in a powerful position to ingratiate
the project since he was Cannon's speech writer. By having Cannon describe the
potential benefits of the innovation and endorse it, the costs to Cannon of stopping
the project were greatly increased. He would have had to admit his previous
support was a mistake.
Cannon needed to be assured the mechanics of the demonstration were good.
The RRS's direct link to Cannon enabled it to involve Cannon in designing the
mechanics thereby making his approval more likely. Cannon probably would not
have spent as much time meeting with Levin and Young brainstorming alternative
ways to manage the project had it not been for the "pet project" status negotiated
rulemaking had. In a late stage of the project the mechanics of the demonstration
were under fire by an influential critic outside the agency. His influence reached
Cannon's office, and effectively changed Cannon's perception of a good and a bad
demonstration. To maintain Cannon's support Young altered the demonstrations to
accommodate the criticism.
Cannon's interest in the project had to be sustained to maintain sufficient
momentum for the project. If response time from Cannon was slow, people might
have doubted EPA's interest, confidence and sincerity in negotiated rulemaking.
Young tried to sustain Cannon's interest by sending frequent memoranda updating
the status of the project and describing the widespread support of the idea.
Unfortunately, factors out of Young's control caused Cannon's turn-around time to
lengthen. Cannon acquired new responsibilities, and had to devote time to the
Superfund controversy and its related issues.
It almost goes without saying that approval from key decision-makers is
necessary for every reform to succeed. The important question is how to secure it.
The short answer is that one must sell the reform to the key decision-makers.
Although no two salespersons have the exact same technique, there are
fundamentals in selling an idea. People sitting in the decision-making position must
be briefed early on in the development of the reform. Presentation of the reform
should spotlight how the decision-makers can personally gain from it. Decision-
makers must be involved in designing the reform. For example, in choosing
between alternatives in major project decisions. Decision-makers should be
continually updated on the progress of the reform. And finally, their public
endorsement of the idea is important. A warning to reformer pushers is don't
promise more than can be delivered. Fraudulent salespersons go nowhere. They
can damage a good idea, and discredit a good office. There are always risks in trying
new ways of doing things, and one should be frank about them.
Reduce threat of change.
Agency staff connected with the traditional regulatory process--the Regulatory
Management Staff, program office's staff, and attorneys in the legal office--had
incentives to resist negotiated rulemaking because they stood to lose from it. It
would be painful to alter habitual and accustomed ways. There would be a personal
cost of learning new ways of doing things, and no guarantee one would be as good at
it as the old ways. Managing and participating in negotiated rulemaking requires
different skills than traditional rulemaking. Individuals with these skills, (e.g.,
strategic saaviness, verbal faculty, and interpersonal skills) would prosper.
Negotiated rulemaking might reduce staff members' power, prestige and security.
Negotiated rulemaking would decrease program offices' authority to make rules by
giving affected parties a much greater role. Negotiated rulemaking would require
the Regulatory Management Staff to admit the traditional way it develops rules was
sometimes inadequate. If negotiated rulemaking worked it would mean less
litigation and therefore less need for attorneys in the agency. Attorneys survive off
of conflict and negotiated rulemaking seeks to decrease it. Staff attitudes needed to
be change to give the demonstration a fighting chance. Not only could they
influence Cannon's decision to permit the demonstrations, but they would play an
important role in the negotiations--developing EPA's bargaining positions and
options as part as the agency's task force.
Young reduced the threat of negotiated rulemaking in a number of ways. One
method was simply by choice of semantics. Inside the Agency, negotiated
rulemaking was referred to as an "experiment"; two "experiments" (as opposed to
"demonstrations") would be run to test the idea. Experiments test ideas.
Demonstrations present ideas. Doubts about whether an idea works or not are much
more apparent in the word experiment than in the word demonstration. It is more
natural to say an experiment failed than a demonstration failed, so change is less
likely as a result of an experiment. The word demonstration is more threatening
because change is more likely. One drawback with calling the project an experiment
may be that participants outside the agency will hesitate to commit sufficient
resources to the process, especially top-management's time. Parties may view the
process as a mock negotiation. They may also resist participating because they do
not want to be "like mice in a lab experiment".
Second, Young presented negotiated rulemaking as only a potential
incremental change to the traditional rulemaking process. The experimental design
of the project helped communicate this. The experiments were self-contained and
would not scrap the established process. If results were favorable from the
experiment, negotiated rulemaking was planned to expand slowly to carefully
selected areas. Personnel and their functions would be only slightly altered. Young
emphasized cautious incrementalism.
Third, as mentioned previously, Young conferred with the individuals
responsible for regulatory development and created a framework for integrating
negotiated rulemaking into the normal regulation development process by retaining
its steps, its members, its groups' names and titles, and functions. The only
difference was that the agency process would be developing negotiating positions
not the verbatum text of the proposed rule.
And fourth, threat was greatly decreased by transferring the project to the
office traditionally responsible for rule development. Their responsibilities were
therefore not decreasing but seemingly increasing to include managing this new
process. Their fears were assuaged because they thought they had much more
control of the reform. They would also now be the ones getting credit if it succeeds.
One risk with handing the reform over to the people involved with the normal
process is sabotage. If once. they are familiar with the reform, they calculate they
will lose from it (e.g., lose power, lose prestige, lose jobs), they are able to make the
experiment fail, thereby preventing or at least hampering it from expanding into a
widespread reform.
